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RESPONDING TO CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 
Raiders, Management, and Boards of Directors 
Freedom Awards 
Announced 
The Trustees and Officers of the Freedoms Founda-
tion of Valley Forge have announced the selection of 
Harding University for three awards. Dr. David Burks, 
President-Elect and Director of the American Studies 
Program, will receive the Valley Forge Honor Cer-
tificate for Excellence in the category of Community 
Programs. The American Studies Program trains young 
men and women for leadership careers in business, 
public life, and education. According to Dr. Burks, "We 
are especially pleased that our hallmark American 
Studies Lecture Series has been honored for bringing 
to the campus ideas, opinions, and view points which 
are basic to American citizenship." 
Dr. David Tucker, will receive the Valley Forge 
Honor Certificate in the category of Economic Educa-
tion, as a result of his directing the Walton Scholar-
ship Program for Central American students. Funded 
by Sam Walton, founder of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , the 
Program emphasizes the application of the principles 
of freedom, democracy, and private enterprise to 
developing countries. According to Tucker, "I am 
especially happy for Mr. Walton, and I am so proud 
for our Walton scholars. Without them, this award 
would not be possible." 
Dr. Don Diffine, will receive the George Washington 
Honor Medal in the category of Published Works, for 
his article, "All American Economics - Made in the 
U.S.A." Printed in the Journal of Private Enterprise 
and Arkansas Business, the article describes and 
analyzes Sam Walton's pioneering "Buy American" 
campaign. Diffine affirmed, "Above all, this honor is 
a salute to Mr. Walton for courageously stepping for-
ward and asking all Americans to join him in commit-
ting themselves to leave our country and our way of 
life a little better for the next generation than it was 
when we found it." 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
As news about hostile takeovers hits the headlines and not 
just the business pages, names like Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn 
and Ivan Boesky have become far better known than the CEOs 
of General Electric, General Motors. General Foods. General 
Mills or any other general. Takeovers have also developed 
a colorful vocabulary of their own - "poison pills," "shark 
repellents," "junk bonds," "raiders:· "white knights," "wolf 
packs," and "greenmail." 
Beyond the glamour there is a genuine public policy debate 
about takeovers that deserves examination and evaluation. 
This report looks at the arguments put forth by the " raiders" 
and "entrenched management" and then discusses tht poten-
tial but vital role of a third force in corporate takeovers. 
INTRODU(TIO'\ 
Many members of Congress have become concerned over 
what is viewed as a rising trend of hostile mergers. " I think 
it is time for Congress to send a clear signal to corporate 
America that we will no longer tolerate unrestrained war-
fare between top managements for control of corporate 
assets." That stirring indictment of competition in the market 
for corporate control was stated by Representative Peter 
Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. 
In that spirit, in the last session of Congress, more than 
50 bills were introduced to deal with mergers and acquisi-
tions. Over 20 hearings on the subject were held by nine dif-
ferent committees. However, no single piece of legislation 
came close to passing. 
Opinions vary sharply on many aspects of corporate 
takeovers, and especially those initiated by shareholders who 
oppose existing managements. Many economists and other 
scholars contend that this process keeps executives on their 
toes and thus enhances shareholder value. The executives of 
these same firms, in striking contrast, assert that hostile at-
tempts to change corporate control reduce business produc-
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tivity and performance. They argue that unfriendly tender 
offers divert management attention and corporate resources 
from the serious business of producing and distributing goods 
and services. 
Yet, on reflection, if the raiders are opportunists, it is boards 
of directors and senior executives who have given them the 
opportunity. Too many CEOs and boards have focused on the 
ballet and the opera as the epitome of a corporation's respon-
sibility to society. They seem to forget that a business is an 
economic institution, designed to provide goods and services 
for consumers in order to benefit the shareholders. 
The irony is that some of the problems of the takeover 
"targets" have arisen from their desire to be more socially 
responsible. The modem business literature tells management 
to balance the desires of employees, customers, suppliers, 
public interest groups, and shareholders. For example, the 
Committee for Economic Development, in its influential 
report on the social responsibility of business, states that the 
professional manager regards himself as a "trustee" balanc-
ing the interests of many diverse participants and constituents 
in the enterprise. It is interesting to note that shareholders 
are only listed as one among those worthy groups - and they 
are listed last. 
THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
Three key arguments are offered by those who believe that 
corporate takeovers are harmful and should be regulated more 
fully by the federal government: 
Hostile takeovers are socially and economically 
detrimental. Hostile takeovers are viewed as leading to forced 
liquidations or restructuring of viable companies by "raiders" 
who reap considerable profit. The process is supposed to leave 
the companies in weakened and highly leveraged positions. 
The groups initiating hostile takeovers are considered to be 
mere financiers and speculators who are not serious about 
the operations of the companies, and who are in it solely for 
quick profits. 
In this view, takeover threats force managers to look to the 
short term in order to keep their current stock price high. 
This diverts attention from longer-term investment potential 
and growth. Alfred Chandler, Jr., the distinguished business 
historian of the Harvard Business School, worries about the 
rising trend of unfriendly takeovers: "How can anyone justify 
it? It provides no productivity, services, or function ... While 
our managers are fighting takeovers, the Japanese are finding 
it easier to take over their markets." 
The common argument offered by economists who assume 
that markets are "efficient" is that mergers, even hostile ones, 
provide economic gains in the form of economies of scale, 
better management and more productive allocation of 
resources. The very threat of a takeover is supposed to 
discipline inefficient management. Redeploying assets in 
restructured companies may cause some unemployment and 
community dislocations, but the assets do not disappear from 
the economy. The new investors have a strong economic in-
centive to put them to productive use. Thus, hostile takeovers 
are seen as creating real value for both bidders' and target 
companies' shareholders. 
Management's rejoinder to the economists is that short-term 
increases in share prices are not the appropriate basis for 
evaluating the costs and benefits of takeovers. Nor do all 
economic analyses of stock data support the standard view 
that stockholders of the target necessarily benefit from 
takeovers. A study at the University of Maryland of 78 
mergers and takeovers in the period 1976-81 concluded that 
three years later the price of the acquirers' stock was much 
lower than if it had continued performing as it had before 
the acquisition. 
To sum up the controversy about takeovers, the shareholders 
of the target firm usually benefit but those of the raiders rarely 
do. The takeover effort must therefore reflect a lack of con-
cern by the raiders with the interests of their shareholders. 
The academic supporters of takeovers look down at existing 
management of target firms because of their supposed lack 
of concern for their shareholders. To be consistent , it is equal-
ly hard to deify the managements of the "sharks," who have 
little more regard for their own shareholders. 
Credit markets are negatively affected by "non-
productive" merger activity. Speaking for the Federal 
Reserve System, Board Chairman Paul Volcker says, "I ... 
have concerns about the potential risks associated with 
mergers and takeovers when these transactions involve 
unusual amounts of leveraging." After acknowledging that 
many mergers may have positive social effects, Volcker warns 
that "these potential benefits clearly are diminished if the 
mergers are accompanied by more fragile balance sheets or 
more precarious loan portfolios." 
Other critics view takeovers as draining resources from 
longer-term investment and growth-enhancing activities. In 
the event of default on "junk" bonds, many financial institu-
tions may be adversely affected. Takeover activity is also 
criticized because of large "transaction costs" benefiting 
lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, and printing and 
advertising firms. 
The responses to these arguments take many forms. The 
concern over transaction costs is put into perspective; their 
large absolute size (in millions of dollars) is dwarfed by the 
billions of dollars involved in the financing process. To the 
critics of junk bonds, the rejoinder is that the risk-reward ratio 
of these securities is in line with the economics of the market 
and basic principles of financial analysis. One risks more in 
order to earn more. Moreover, the credit is not "used up" 
but recycled in the economy. 
Abuses have crept into the takeover process. One 
prominent attorney describes the situation as follows: "We 
have entered the era of the two-tier, front-end loaded, 
bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover." In this view, the free 
flow of information has been impeded and the relative 
economic power of bidders and management has been altered. 
The use of high-yield, low-rated "junk" bonds to finance ac-
quistion is one such example. 
Investment bankers note two current practices that may be 
considered to be "abuses." One is the ability to commence 
a takeover without having binding financial commitments in 
place. Such conditional bids have a headline-grabbing effect 
and stampede the shares of the company into the hands of 
arbitrageurs and speculators. The second abuse involves the 
tactic of putting a company into " play." Seemingly deliberate 
leaks drive the shares of the company into the hands of short-
term speculators. 
The proponents of takeover efforts note that many other 
abuses arise from the efforts of managements to repel un-
solicited overtures. They contend that shareholder value is 
reduced when companies adopt "poison pills" and other 
"shark repellents." 
ALTERNATE PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES 
Proposed responses to the problems generated by hostile 
takeovers range from laissez-faire to tough new legislation 
designed to "correct" the perceived market failures. Here are 
the five key alternative approaches : 
I. No problem exists, therefore, no "solution" is 
necessary. The prevailing academic view is that the market 
for corporate control is functioning reasonably well. Given 
the passive roles of many boards of directors, hostile takeovers 
are helpful in keeping companies on their toes and in replac-
ing inefficient , entrenched managements. If there is any role 
for public policy, it is to prevent management from thwart-
ing the will of the shareholders. 
2. There is a problem with regard to hostile takeovers, 
but it will cure itself. Those in this second category believe 
that the hostile takeover phenomenon will cool substantially 
when the next serious recession reduces the earnings of the 
highly leveraged companies. Many corporations being 
restructured to a riskier mode as a result of leveraged buyouts 
may go "belly up." These negative experiences will dampen 
the ardor of other potential hostile suitors and reduce the 
funding available to them. 
In this second view, the takeover wave will subside as a 
result of natural causes and hence no change in public policy 
is warranted. 
3. There is a continuing problem, but it can be handled 
with further changes in tax policy. Because the tax deduc-
tibility of interest is a key element of most hostile takeovers, 
this group contends that changes need only be made in tax 
provisions favoring debt over equity. 
Interest charges are tax deductible while dividends are taxed 
twice, once at the corporate level and again at the level of 
the individual shareholder. Even though the current tax reform 
legislation will remove capital gains advantages for equity 
financing, the reduction in corporate and individual tax rates 
will reduce tax differentials for debt versus equity overall. 
4. The federal government should resort to additional 
regulatory devices. One possibility is to tighten the criteria 
for allowable investments for life insurance companies and 
pension funds. Some favor the SEC investigating trading 
"abuses," such as manipulation of stock prices via false 
rumors, leaks, and other sharp arbitrageur practices. 
5. The takeover problem is so serious that tough new 
legislation is required. The aim is to make it more difficult 
for shareholder groups to make tender offers that are not en-
dorsed by the company's board of directors. 
Most of the bills introduced in Congress to regulate cor-
porate acquisitions are designed to protect target companies. 
For example, one bill would give outside directors of a target 
company the right to veto a tender offer or the acquisition 
of a controlling interest , subject to reversal by a vote of the 
shareholders. Another bill would prohibit open market pur-
chases by one corporation of more than 20 percent of 
another's stock. Yet another legislative proposal would deny 
successful acquirers a tax deduction for interest on debt in-
curred to finance their acquisition . 
Moving across the spectrum of government intervention 
in corporate governance is no simple matter. Each of the more 
activist approaches is likely to generate serious and often 
unexpected side effects - the "government failure" that so 
frequently accompanies attempts to deal with "market 
failure." 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contests for control of some large companies have focused 
national attention on hostile takeovers. Yet these transactions 
represent only a small fraction of the changes in control of 
American corporations carried out each year. Most takeovers 
continue to be friendly and approved by the boards of both 
companies involved. In many cases, the board of the target 
firm may have required a bit of coaxing - such as the threat 
to "walk away" and see the price of the target company's stock 
drop sharply. 
Considerable evidence shows that takeover contests are 
beneficial for stockholders of target companies. In this regard, 
it is intriguing to note the views of top executives of the most 
successful firms toward their stockholders. In one recent 
study, two faculty members of the Harvard Business School 
report that none of the top executives of the 12 successful 
American companies they studied was concerned about the 
current market value of the company's stock. One CEO stated 
this position very clearly: 
The highest priority with me is perpetuation 
of the enterprise. I'd like to leave this joint in bet-
ter shape than when someone passed me the 
baton. I have to take care of the shareholders in 
this, but I don't sweat the shareholders too much. 
Most investors in our industry are passive. 
The two researchers concluded that the successful managers 
were committed "first and foremost, to the enhancement of 
corporate wealth, which includes not only the firm's finan-
cial assets reflected on the balance sheet but also its impor-
tant human assets and its competitive positions in the various 
markets in which it operates." 
Do corporate takeovers promote economic efficiency? The 
great bulk of the academic literature states that the answer 
is yes. Why else, the reasoning goes, would share prices rise 
on the mere announcement of a hostile takeover effort? 
One comprehensive study shows that tenderers have not 
managed the businesses they acquired any more profitably 
than their industry peers. Nor have they achieved significant 
profitability improvements relative to the pre-takeover situa-
tion. In addition, the Congressional Tax Committee says a 
large portion of the stock price gain is due to capitalizing the 
tax benefits. 
Yet there is no need - or justification - to argue that all 
takeover attempts are benign or that every effort to repulse 
them is laudable. Some businesses benefit from new manage-
ment or even the threat of a change in management. Some 
"shark repellents" benefit small stockholders by providing 
barriers to two-tiered tender offers. Reasonable amounts..9f 
self-interest can be expected on the part of both those attempt-
ing corporate takeovers and those opposing them . 
The most significant factor to take into account in evaluating 
proposals for government to "do something" about hostile 
takeovers is historical. The long and intricate experiences of 
government involvement in business decision-making are not 
impressive. Study after study shows that government often 
does more harm than good when it interferes in private 
economic matters. The presence of some shortcoming in the 
private sector (often called "market failure") is not sufficient 
cause for government to intervene. Much government regula-
tion fails to meet an elementary benefit-cost test. 
The heart of a positive response to unsolicited takeovers 
is not poison pills or shark repellents nor is it government 
restraints on raiders. There is a third and often neglected force 
designed to foster stockholder interests, the company's own 
board of directors. 
Under law, all corporate power is exercised by or under 
the authority of the board. Directors must really act as 
fiduciaries of the shareholders. But the complacent or rubber-
stamp director has not totally vanished from the boardroom. 
Responding more fully to the desires of the owners of the 
business is the key to repelling takeover threats. Corporate 
officials, both board members and officers, often forget un-
til the company's stock is in play that shareholders continually 
vote with their dollars. 
The most important, and rarely performed, duty of the 
board is to learn how to say no. It is up to the board to veto 
proposed capital investments whose yield is below the cost 
of capital - even if some key executive is going to get upset 
because it was his or her pet project. 
The outside directors especially must learn to act on the 
knowledge that the inside directors who serve on the board 
with them are occasionally motivated by different concerns. 
Acquisitions may be good for executives whose compensa-
tion is related to the size of the company, but some can be 
poor investments for shareholders. A supergenerous corporate 
donation to the ballet may do wonders for the social life of 
the CEO, but it hardly benefits the shareholders. 
The challenge to many boards is to pay out more cash for 
shareholders and to reduce outlays for low-yield projects. The 
record is clear: If the board will not make the difficult choices 
that enhance the value of the corporation , the takeover art-
ists will. Takeover mania is not a cause but a symptom of 
the unmet challenge. 
Outside directors are the heart of the critical third force 
in contests for corporate control. They need to bear in mind 
that the future of the corporation is in their hands - as long 
as they serve the desires of the shareholders. 
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